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TRUST ADMINISTRATION -APPORTIONMENT AND OTHER REM-
EDIES OF AN INCOME BENEFICIARY WHEN THE TRUSTEE'S RETEN-
TION OF UNPRODUCTIVE PROPERTY CAUSES A Loss OR TERMINA-
TION OF INCOME - When a trust is created for successive bene-
ficiaries, the life tenant and remainderman each have interests in 
the trust estate. The former has the right to income1 and to pre-
vent the improper reduction of corpus during his life;2 the latter 
is entitled to the corpus on the death of the former. During the 
time that any of the trust assets fail to yield an income, a life cestui 
is deprived of his interest in that trust. The purpose of this com-
ment is to examine apportionment and other remedies of a bene-
ficiary who has been deprived of his income by the retention of 
unproductive property,8 and especially to examine the problems 
which arise when the trustee's retention of such assets constitutes 
a breach of trust. 
I. REMEDIES AGAINST THE TRUSTEE 
Courts will frequently permit a trustee temporarily to retain 
unproductive property which cannot be immediately sold at a fair 
price. Such a retention may be permitted either when the settlor 
1 It has even been held that the life tenant has the sole right to complain where the 
trustee either retained an unproductive asset, St. Louis Trust Co. v. Ohio, 240 Mo. App. 
1033, 222 S.W. (2d) 556 (1949), or charged improper expenses against income, Estate of 
Walsh, 32 N.J. Super. 528, 108 A. (2d) 652 (1954). 
2 A reduction of corpus would in turn bring about a reduction of income. For a discus-
sion of the rights of various beneficiaries to complain of injury to corpus and income, see 
9 A.L.R. (2d) 10 (1950). See also 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §216.2 (1956), and note 3 to 
that section. 
3 Section 11 of the Uniform Principal and Income Act defines unproductive property 
as "realty or personalty which for more than a year and until disposed of as hereinafter 
stated has not produced an average net income of at least one per centum per annum of 
its fair inventory value or in default thereof its market value at the time the principal 
was established or of its cost where purchased later ..•. " TRUSTS REsTATEMENT SECOND 
§231 (1956) defines unproductive property as property "which produces no income or an 
income substantially less than the current rate of return on trust investments .... " 
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originally entrusted the property to the fiduciary in its unproduc-
tive state4 or when the trustee acquires property which later ceases 
to produce income.5 Under such circumstances, the trustee is not 
responsible for the resulting loss of income. 6 On the other hand, 
if the trustee violated his fiduciary duty in acquiring or retaining 
such property, then the life tenant has a cause of action against 
the trustee for damages, 7 usually measured by the rate of return 
on trust investments.8 Under certain circumstances9 the damages 
will be computed at the maximum legal rate of interest, or com-
pound interest.10 
Also, where there has been an improper retention of unpro-
ductive property, the life beneficiary usually has the power to 
compel a sale of the property,11 to charge the trustee with the loss 
brought about by the improper investment12 and have his com-
pensation reduced13 and to remove him if the beneficial interest 
will be best served by so doing.14 
II. APPORTIONMENT OF THE SALE PROCEEDS OF 
UNPRODUCTIVE PROPERTY 
Another remedy, and one which has given the courts much 
difficulty, is apportionment. When apportionment is granted, a 
life cestui of a trust which has retained unproductive property 
obtains a portion of the proceeds if this property is eventually 
sold,15 thus reimbursing him for the loss of income during the 
holding period.16 
4 Patterson v. Vivian, 63 Misc. 389, 117 N.Y.S. 504 (1909), mod. on other grounds 137 
App. Div. 596, 122 N.Y.S. 347 (1910) (where the court refused to permit an apportionment 
of the sale proceeds of property which was acquired from the testator in its unproductive 
state). 
5 Will of Des Forges, 243 Wis. 178, 9 N.W. (2d) 609 (194:3); Thusrs REsrATEMENT SECOND 
§231, comment c (1959). 
6 This assumes that the trustee did not breach his duty by improperly delaying the sale. 
7 TRUSI'S REsrATEMENT SECOND §209 (1959); Moore, "A Rationalization of Trust Sur-
charge Cases," 96 UNlV. PA. L. REv. 647 (194:8). 
s As a rule, neither the highest legal rate of interest nor compound interest is assessed 
against the trustee. See First and American Nat. Bank of Duluth v. Andrews, 219 Minn. 325, 
17 N.W. (2d) 656 at 664: (194:5). See, generally, 2 Scorr, Thusrs, 2d ed., 207 (1956); Wright, 
"The Measure of the Trustee's Liability for Improper Investments," 80 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 
1105 (1932). 
9 E.g., where the breach was willful. 
10 Riggs v. Loweree, 189 Md. 437, 56 A. (2d) 152 (1947). 
11 Willis v. Holcomb, 83 Ohio St. 254, 94: N.E. 486 (1911). 
12 See 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., § §209, 213.3 (1956). 
13 See 4 BOGERT, ThuSTS §979 (194:8). 
14 See 4 BOGERT, ThuSTS §861 (1948). See 98 A.L.R. 1132 (1935). 
15 See 3 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §241.6 (1956) for instances involving a sale of the un-
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A. Common Law 
Once it has been determined that the testator intended ( or 
would have intended had he considered the matter) an apportion-
ment, there would seem to be two theoretical bases upon which it 
may be granted. First, it may be argued that since the word "in-
come" is far from clear, we must look to the intention of the 
testator to interpret this word and to determine whether the 
testator intended the word "income" to include a part of the sale 
proceeds of unproductive property. This result seems quite rea-
sonable when the unproductive property was deliberately retained 
in order to obtain a better price, and when the property is in fact 
sold for more than could have been obtained when the duty to 
sell first arose. If income is that which is derived from capital ( or 
labor, as the case may be) and if the only thing derived or intended 
to be derived from holding this capital was the increment in value, 
it would seem that this increment in value might properly be 
termed income. Another possible theoretical basis for apportion-
ment is that this constitutes a proper deviation from the express 
terms of a trust, since it is necessary in order to carry out the pur-
pose of the trust.17 This is done whenever the court orders a 
cy pres administration of a trust.18 
In attempting to ascertain the probable intention of the testa-
tor, the courts consider a number of factors. One of the most 
important indicia of this intent is the respective relationships of the 
life tenant and remainderman to the testator. It is more likely 
that an intention by the testator to have an apportionment of the 
sale proceeds will be found to exist if the income cestui was the 
productive property after the termination of the life tenant's interest. See Uniform Prin-
cipal and Income Act, §11, which states: "Where .•. the trustee is under a duty to change 
the form of the investment as soon as it may be done without sacrifice of value and such 
change is delayed, but is made before the principal is finally distributed, then the tenant, 
or in case of his death his personal representative, shall be entitled to share in the net 
proceeds received from the property as delayed income to the extent hereinafter stated." 
Emphasis added. 
16 See cases collected in 103 A.L.R. 1271 (1936); 115 A.L.R. 881 (1938); 116 A.L.R. 1354 
(1938); 129 A.L.R. 1314 (1940); 142 A.L.R. 264 (1943). 
17 See Walker v. Thomas, (D.C. Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 667 at 669, indicating that the 
court would reject the literal meaning of words in a trust instrument in order to carry 
out the testator's intention. See also Thurlow v. Berry, 249 Ala. 597, 32 S. (2d) 526 (1947), 
and Estate of Loring, 29 Cal. (2d) 423, 175 P. (2d) 524 (1946) to the effect that the doc-
trine of equitable deviation is applicable to private as well as charitable trusts. But see 
note, 30 MINN. L. REv. 553 (1946) stating that deviation will not often be permitted when 
the interest of another beneficiary will thereby be invaded without his consent. 
18 4 Scorr, TRusrs, 2d ed., §399.3 (1956). 
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principal object of the testator's bounty,19 and especially if this 
beneficiary was dependent upon the testator.20 
The courts also consider the amount of unproductive property 
as compared to the size of the trust estate, so as to deny appor-
tionment when the unproductive asset is small in comparison 
to the entire estate. Thus, in Creed v. Connelly,21 where the un-
productive property constituted approximately one seventh of the 
total value, the court denied apportionment. A similar result 
was reached in In re Marshall's Estate,22 where such property com-
prised less than one twentieth of the total. Moreover, the courts 
may consider, in addition to the relative amounts of productive 
and unproductive property, other equitable factors such as the 
adequacy of the remaining trust income to support the life cestui.23 
Still another factor which is often considered in determining 
whether to grant apportionment is whether the asset was received 
in its unproductive condition from the testator,24 and if so, 
whether there was a mandatory direction to sell it.25 Ordinarily, 
if the testator leaves unproductive property to the trustee, it is 
believed that since he knew it to be unproductive, he would not 
have intended the life tenant to receive an income until it could 
be sold at a reasonable price.26 However, if the testator ordered 
that the property be sold and the proceeds invested, no such in-
ference as to his intent will arise.27 Mr. Shattuck severely criticizes 
this result, stating that there are many reasons for inserting or 
19 In re Rowland's Estate, 273 N.Y. 100, 6 N.E. (2d) 393 (1937); Quinn v. First Nat. 
Bank, 168 Tenn. 30, 73 S.W. (2d) 692 (1934); Furniss v. Cruikshank, 230 N.Y. 495, 130 N.E. 
625 (1921); Lawrence v. Littlefield, 215 N.Y. 561, 109 N.E. 611 (1915). See also comment, 
40 YALE L.J. 275 (1930). 
20 Matter of Jackson, 258 N.Y. 281, 179 N.E. 496 (1932). See also Jordan v. Jordan, 192 
Mass. 337, 78 N.E. 459 (1906) which distinguished Edwards v. Edwards, 183 Mass. 581, 67 
N .E. 658 (1903) on the basis of the beneficiary's need for funds. 
21272 Mass. 241, 172 N .E. 106 (1930). 
22 43 Misc. 238, 88 N.Y.S. 550 (1904). But see Skilton, "The Rights of Successive Bene-
ficiaries in Unproductive Trust Assets Not Bearing Interest," 15 TEMPLE L.Q. 241 at 259 
(1941). 
23 Lang v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 359 Mo. 688, 223 S.W. (2d) 404 (1949). 
24 See Patterson v. Vivian, 63 Misc. 389, 117 N.Y.S. 504 (1909), mod. on other grounds 
137 App. Div. 596, 122 N.Y.S. 347 (1910). 
25 Even though the property was received from the testator in its unproductive state, 
if there was a mandatory direction to sell, there is a strong likelihood that apportionment 
will be granted. Edwards v. Edwards, 183 Mass. 581, 67 N.E. 658 (1903). However, appor-
tionment was denied in an instance where there was not even an express power of sale. 
Creed v. Connelly, 272 Mass. 241, 172 N.E. 106 (1930). 
26 See Creed v. Connelly, 272 Mass. 241, 172 N.E. 106 (1930). But see In re Rowland's 
Estate, 273 N.Y. 100, 6 N.E. (2d) 393 (1937). 
27 See Edwards v. Edwards, 183 Mass. 581, 67 N.E. 658 (1903). 
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omitting a mandatory direction to sell other than those concerned 
with the computation of income.28 
A few cases29 and the Uniform Principal and Income Act30 
have granted apportionment only to the extent that the ultimate 
sale price of the unproductive property exceeded the cost or in-
ventory value of such property, thus preserving the corpus of the 
trust intact. However, it would appear that most cases reject 
this distinction.31 
Lastly, courts may arrive at different results in cases involving 
different types of property.32 For example, where the asset sold 
was an interest-bearing obligation and where there was interest 
in arrears, courts quite properly tend to grant apportionment.33 
Indeed, dividing the sale proceeds of an interest-bearing note with 
interest in arrears is not truly an apportionment of corpus to the 
extent that the income cestui's right to interest was also "ex-
changed" for the property acquired in settlement of the debt. 
However, decisions denying apportionment of the sale proceeds 
of stock,34 and other personalty,35 under circumstances which may 
well have allowed an apportionment of the sale proceeds of realty, 
seem unjustifiable. 
In conjunction with the remedy of apportionment, the com-
mon law also permitted the income beneficiary to shift the ex-
penses of the unproductive asset to corpus. The ability of the life 
tenant to so charge corpus with the burden of maintaining un-
productive property is usually determined by the same criteria 
that govern the availability of apportionment upon the ultimate 
sale of the property.36 If expenses have been paid from income, 
28 Shattuck, "Unproductive Trust Property in Massachusetts," 20 BoST. UNIV. L. REv. 
447 at 452 (1940). 
20 See, e.g., Willis v. Holcomb, 83 Ohio St. 254, 94 N.E. 486 (1911). 
30 Uniform Principal and Income Act, §II, 9B Uniform Laws Annotated 365 (1957). 
31 See Jordan v. Jordan, 192 Mass. 337, 78 N.E. 459 (1906). 
32 See In re Clarke's Estate, 166 Misc. 807, 3 N.Y.S. (2d) 60 (1938), granting apportion-
ment of the sale proceeds of personalty. Other courts have denied apportionment of per-
sonalty. See, generally, 3 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §241.1 (1956). 
33 Compare In re Lander's Estate, 162 Misc. 201, 294 N.Y.S. 58 (1937), which denied 
apportionment of the sale proceeds of preferred stock, to the cases cited in 103 A.L.R. 1271 
at 1286 (1936). 
34 See Shattuck, "Unproductive Trust Property in Massachusetts," 20 BoST. UNIV. L. 
REv. 447 (1940). 
35 In re Searle, [1900] 2 Ch. 829, distinguishing realty and personalty. Cf. In re 
Lander's Estate, 162 Misc. 201, 294 N.Y.S. 58 (1937). 
36 See 103 A.L.R. 1271 at 1273 (1936); 167 A.L.R. 1431 (1947). But see Hite v. Hite, 
93 Ky. 257, 20 S.W. 778 (1892) following a more liberal rule for reallocation of expenses 
than for apportionment. 
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and if apportionment is later granted, the prevailing view is that 
expenses are to be repaid to income from the gross sale proceeds, 
and then the balance-the net proceeds-are apportioned.37 
B. Restatement of Trusts 
The Restatement of Trusts dispenses with these tests of inten-
tion and states that in the absence of a contrary direction in the 
trust instrument, there shall be an apportionment whenever an 
asset produces substantially less than the current rate of income 
on trust investments.38 However, even courts purporting to fol-
low this position will deny apportionment if the equities suffi-
ciently favor the remainderman.39 Such deviations from the Re-
statement position are not surprising, since the Restatement ex-
tended the application of apportionment considerably beyond 
what appears to be the position of the case law. Nevertheless, if 
a court desires to obtain one of the primary advantages of the 
Restatement position - the avoidance of the case-to-case determina-
tion of the testator's intention -it would seem wise to limit such 
deviation to the unusual case so that litigation will seldom appear 
profitable to the remainderman. 
The Restatement permits the shifting to corpus of expenses 
on unproductive property whenever apportionment would be 
available.40 Section 241, after providing that the net proceeds of 
the sale shall be apportioned in the absence of a contrary direction 
in the trust instrument, states: 
"The net proceeds are determined by adding to the net 
sale price the net income received, or deducting therefrom 
the net loss incurred, in carrying the property prior to the 
sale." 
Comment d to this section provides: 
". . . if carrying charges have been paid out of income, 
the amount so paid will be added to the amount which the 
life beneficiary would otherwise receive on the sale." 
37 See TRUSTS REsrATEMENT SECOND §241, comment l (1959); 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS §827, 
notes 82, 83 (1948). 
as TRUSTS REsrATEMENT SECOND §241 (1959). This section also requires apportionment 
if the trustee delays selling "wasting" property or property producing an income substan-
tially more than the current rate of return on trust investments. 
39 Lang v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 359 Mo. 688, 223 S.W. 404 (1949). 
40 TRUSTS REsrATEMENT SECOND §241 (1959) provides that there shall be an apportion-
ment in the absence of a contrary direction by the trustee. 
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C. Uniform Principal and Income Act 
Section 11 of the Uniform Principal and Income Act also 
makes provision for apportionment without looking to the un-
expressed intention of the testator in each instance. Apportion-
ment is proper under this act whenever the net income from an 
asset falls below a mechanically determined level.41 However, 
unlike the Restatement and the common law, the uniform act 
provides that " ... in no event shall such income [i.e., the income 
to be created by an apportionment] be more than the amount by 
which the net proceeds exceed the fair inventory value of the 
property or in default thereof its market value at the time the 
principal was established or its cost where purchased later." This 
is a very significant restriction. It permits apportionment only in 
the case where unproductive property is eventually sold at a profit. 
It offers no assistance to the life beneficiary in the frequent case 
where the unproductive investment causes a loss both to income 
and to corpus. This does not seem to be an apportionment of 
corpus, but merely an allocation of capital gains to income in an 
instance where there is little or no ordinary income. 
The Uniform Principal and Income Act also permits a shift-
ing of expenses from income to corpus, but the result reached 
under this act is not always identical with that attained by the 
application of the common-law. rule. This act provides that ex-
penses on the unproductive property shall be charged to principal, 
but that they shall be deducted from the gross proceeds of the 
property when sold, the balance-the net proceeds-being appor-
tioned. However, because of the provision in this act which limits 
the apportionment to the amount by which the net proceeds exceed 
cost or inventory value of the property, a frequent result of reim-
bursing the life tenant for these expenses will be to reduce by an 
equal amount42 the apportionment to be given him when the prop-
erty is sold. 43 
41 Uniform Principal and Income Act §11 (1957), and see note 3 supra. 
42 Under the uniform act the benefits of the provision shifting the expense of holding 
unproductive property to corpus are frequently illusory. This can be demonstrated by the 
following hypothetical. A trust for successive beneficiaries has sold for $100,000 a parcel 
of unproductive property which cost $80,000. This property had been retained in its 
unproductive state for five years during which time expenses were paid from income in 
the amount of $10,000. 
If the uniform act did not shift expenses to corpus, then the life tenant would receive 
no reimbursement for his previous outlay of $10,000 expenses, but he would receive an 
apportionment of $20,000 computed as follows: 
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III. APPORTIONMENT WHERE THE Loss w AS CAUSED 
BY THE TRUSTEE'S BREACH OF DUTY 
Where the unproductive property is retained without fault by 
the trustee, a refusal to grant apportionment would deprive the 
life cestui of both the income from the unproductive asset and 
also of other trust income to the extent that it is needed to pay 
the cost of maintaining that property. This sacrifice would be 
forced upon the life beneficiary in order to prevent an immediate 
sale for less than what is considered as the real value of the prop-
erty. Since the retention is largely for the benefit of corpus, it is 
reasonable to suppose that the testator would have wanted a por-
tion of the sale proceeds to be awarded to income as reparation 
for the loss sustained during the unproductive holding period. 
But compare the above situation to an instance where the trustee 
negligently delayed the sale of an unproductive asset. In the 
$100,000 
-------SB0,000 award to corpus, and the balance of the $100,000 or $20,000 
l+ (.05 X 5 yrs.) 
to income. The limitation (that the amount given to income shall not be greater than 
the amount by which the net proceeds of sale exceed the cost of the property) will not 
reduce the $20,000 award, since that award is not greater than the $100,000 sale pro-
ceeds less the $80,000 cost. 
Under the uniform act in its present form the net benefit to the life tenant would be no 
greater. The net proceeds will be $90,000 ($100,000-$10,000 expenses), and the life tenant 
will be reimbursed for the $10,000 of expenses which he incurred. The apportionment 
will then grant $10,000 of the remaining $90,000 to income, computed as follows: 
$90,000 
-------$72,000 to corpus and $18,000 to income, except that the limitation 
l+ (.05 X 5 yrs.) 
states that the apportionment shall not be more than the amount by which the net 
proceeds ($90,000) exceed the cost of the property ($80,000), thereby reducing the 
award to $10,000. 
Thus under the uniform act, despite its shifting expenses to corpus, the life tenant 
receives $10,000 of expenses and $10,000 of apportionment. In the absence of the shifting 
of expenses he received a $20,000 apportionment. The result is the same. Only where 
the property is sold for an amount sufficiently large to avoid the limitation will there be 
any benefit from the provision shifting expenses to corpus. Thus if the cost of the prop-
erty in the above hypothetical were $70,000 instead of $80,000, then the life tenant would 
have received the $10,000 expenses and $18,000 of income, for the limitation would have 
been ineffective to reduce the life tenant's portion. Or if the cost had been $75,000, the 
limitation would not have completely eliminated the effect of shifting the expenses to 
corpus. The life tenant would have received the $10,000 expenses plus $15,000 apportion-
ment ($18,000 but limited to $15,000 which is the amount by which the $90,000 net pro-
ceeds exceed the cost of $75,000). 
43 The uniform act not only causes the life cestui to pay the carrying charges if there 
are proceeds available from the apportionment; it also requires that interest be paid on 
the amount of these charges from the fund created by the apportionment. Charging the 
life beneficiary with interest is improper, since the remainderman would not have received 
the interest on the fund had it not been used to pay carrying charges. See Brandis, "Trust 
Administration: Apportionment of Proceeds of Sale of Unproductive Land and of Ex-
penses," 9 N.C.L. REv. 127 at 137 (1930). 
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former situation the life tenant was compelled to sacrifice income 
for the intended benefit of corpus. In the latter case because the 
loss was caused by the breach of the trustee, it is probable that the 
life cestui could have compelled a sale of the improper asset.44 The 
former situation is similar to a loan, where the life cestui was 
ordered to forego income temporarily in hope of avoiding a sacri-
fice sale of a trust asset; when the asset is later sold, he is repaid 
for his loss through apportionment. It would seem that the life 
tenant's equities vis-a-vis those of the remainderman are much 
weaker in the latter situation where the loss was caused by a 
negligent fiduciary. Indeed, it is often arguable that the life 
tenant should be estopped to claim an apportionment where the 
trustee was negligent, and the life tenant fails to call the matter 
to the attention of the remainderman by requesting that the 
charges be placed on corpus, or by instituting an action to compel 
a sale of the asset. This will be discussed in more detail later in 
the comment.45 
The testator's probable intention in instances where a trustee's 
breach causes a loss of income or corpus furnishes little aid, for 
there is no compelling reason to believe that the grantor would 
have wanted this loss to be recouped by the life tenant against 
corpus rather than by proceeding against the fiduciary to whose 
judgment the testator entrusted his property.46 Where the trustee 
is not negligent, apportionment is the only available remedy, and 
the intent of the grantor that this remedy should exist can be 
more readily assumed. 
However, neither the Restatement nor the few cases on point 
have refused apportionment because of trustee negligence. Sec-
tion 241 of the Restatement of Trusts, Second, comment a, pro-
vides that there shall be apportionment irrespective of negligence 
by the trustee in acquiring or retaining the unproductive prop-
erty. The uniform act is not entirely clear on this point.47 
44 Willis v. Holcomb, 83 Ohio St. 254, 94 N.E. 486 (1911). However, if before the 
life tenant has a reasonable opportunity to compel a sale, a sale becomes impractical, the 
equities would be more evenly balanced between life tenant and remainderman. 
41S See text accompanying footnotes 62-65. 
46 In re Bothwell's Estate, 65 Cal. App. 598, 151 P. (2d) 298 (1944) contains dicta to 
the effect that apportionment must be used if available. No other case indicating this has 
been found. 
47 Section 11 of the Uniform Principal and Income Act provides for apportionment 
when " ..• the trustee is under a duty to change the form of the investment as soon as 
it may be done without sacrifice of value and such change is delayed. . . ." (Emphasis 
added.) Does this contemplate a situation when the trustee breached his duty by origi-
nally acquiring the asset? Or where the trustee is under a duty to sell immediately? 
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Of the few American cases48 on point, the earliest is Parsons v. 
Winslow,49 where the trustee improperly invested the trust corpus, 
losing not only the income, but also the greater part of the capital 
as well. The trustee was surcharged but his personal estate was 
insufficient to absorb the entire loss. The court ordered an ap-
portionment of the recovery. This court showed no indication 
that it considered that the existence of negligence on the part of 
the trustee in any manner affected its determination to grant ap-
portionment. Nor did the court show any indication that it would 
treat a claim for apportionment of the corpus itself any differently 
from a claim for an apportionment of the recovery from the 
trustee.50 
The question arose more recently in Tennessee when a trustee 
bank which had misinvested trust funds became insolvent.51 The 
bank was surcharged but the satisfaction was less than complete, 
and the issue presented was how the loss should be borne between 
the life tenant and remainderman. The court held that both the 
recovery from the trustee and the sale proceeds of the unproductive 
property should be apportioned between the two classes of bene-
ficiaries, 52 but there was no discussion of the effect, if any, of the 
trustee's breach on the grant of apportionment. 
An unusual approach was taken by the California Court of 
Appeals53 in a case where the loss was caused by the improper 
48 There are also a few English cases on point. In re Grabowski's Settlement, L.R. 6 
Eq. 12 (1868) involved a life tenant's request for apportionment of the recovery from a 
trustee whose negligence caused loss to both income and corpus. The trustee's assets 
were insufficient to satisfy the claims of both beneficiaries, and the court awarded the 
entire amount to corpus. Since the award was granted for loss to income as well as to 
corpus, it would seem that the life tenant should have had an interest in the recovery 
irrespective of apportionment. Another case, In re Bird, [1901] I Ch. 916, involved a 
request for apportionment of the sale proceeds of the unproductive property (here also 
there was a loss both to income and corpus) and the court took note of the existence of a 
breach of trust, but permitted apportionment. However, there was no negligent delay by 
the life tenant in not compelling a sale, as neither beneficiary was aware of the existence 
of the improper investment. 
49 16 Mass. 361 (1820). 
50 The opinion did not state whether the apportionment only involved the recovery 
from the trustee, or whether the amount salvaged from that improper investment was also 
being apportioned. In the former instance, the apportionment is not very significant since 
it seems that the recovery represented both income and corpus, and thus both cestui 
should have had an interest in the recovery irrespective of apportionment. 
51 Cate v. Hamilton Nat. Bank, 178 Tenn. 249, 156 S.W. (2d) 812 (1941); Quinn 
v. First Nat. Bank, 168 Tenn. 30, 70 S.W. (2d) 692 (1934). 
52 See the argument of counsel in In re Grabowski's Settlement, L.R. 6 Eq. 12 (1868), 
contending that a distinction should be recognized between an apportionment of the 
recovery from the trustee and an apportionment of the sale proceeds of the unproductive 
property. 
53 In re Bothwell's Estate, 65 Cal. App. (2d) 598, 151 P. (2d) 298 (1944). 
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holding of unproductive property. The court not only held that 
there could be an apportionment, but said in dicta that where 
apportionment was available the life tenant could not proceed 
against the trustee.54 This dicta seems clearly unreasonable. 
There is no reason to immunize the trustee from suit by the life 
tenant or remainderman because apportionment was available to 
shift the incidence of the loss between the two classes of 
beneficiaries. 
There are other instances where the question of apportion-
ment arose55 or was mentioned in dicta56 when the trustee had been 
guilty of a breach of duty which caused the loss. However, none 
of these cases discussed the effect, if any, of the trustee's negligence 
upon their determination to grant or refuse apportionment. Nor 
did the cases distinguish between a grant of apportionment of the 
sale proceeds of the unproductive property, and a division of the 
recovery against the trustee in which both beneficiaries were 
interested. 
Let us now turn to look at the net effect of the rule permitting 
apportionment where the loss was caused by the trustee's breach. 
First, if trustee negligence can be proved and if the trustee is 
financially responsible, then the grant of apportionment will be 
of no significance since both parties will be made whole at the 
expense of the trustee57 and the cost of suit, if not recovered from 
the trustee, will probably be apportioned between the two classes 
of cestui in proportion to their respective interests in the recovery.58 
54 Id. at 604-605. 
55 Plunkett v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1941) ll8 F. (2d) 644 at 648. 
56 Matter of Jackson, 258 N.Y. 281 at 290, 179 N.E. 496 (1932). 
57 This assumes negligence can be proved. The risk of failure to prove trustee negli-
gence will normally fall most heavily upon the remainderman. If the proceeds of sale are 
substantial and if the property has not been unproductive for more than a few years, the 
life tenant can recover most of his lost income via apportionment. If the jurisdiction 
grants apportionment irrespective of trustee neglect, then the remainderman will have to 
prove the trustee's breach in order to recoup from the trustee the loss caused to corpus by 
the apportionment. On the other hand, if apportionment is denied in instances where 
the trustee is negligent, the remainderman will still have the burden of proving the trustee's 
breach in defending against the apportionment claim by the life tenant. (If the burden 
of proving the trustee's freedom from negligence were placed upon the life tenant, he 
might well be in the position of being unable to prove negligence so as to obtain damages 
from the trustee, and unable to prove an absence of negligence so as to obtain an appor-
tionment.) Only when apportionment would provide substantially less than the amount 
of the lost income would the life tenant have any real interest in proving the breach of 
duty by the trustee. 
58 If the trustee is found negligent, he may be surcharged for the amount of the 
objector's attorney fees. See Perry v. Perry, 343 Ill. App. 644, 99 N.E. (2d) 715 (1951); 
note, 16 GA. B.J. 93 (1953). But see Hardy v. Hardy, 217 Ark. 305, 230 S.W. (2d) ll 
(1950). If the attorney fees are not charged to the trustee they may well be charged ratably 
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If, on the other hand, the trustee is totally without funds, then 
the effect of apportionment is the same as where there is no 
negligence at all-it shifts the incidence of the loss from income to 
corpus to the extent of the award. If apportionment were denied 
in such a case because of trustee neglect, then the loss would remain 
upon income. Denying apportionment seems entirely warranted 
where the life tenant had knowledge of the breach and ample op-
portunity to compel a sale of the property, and where he in-
excusably delayed in so doing. This is especially true if the life 
tenant did not request that carrying charges be placed upon 
corpus thereby alerting the remainderman to the unproductivity 
of the asset. Without such notice, the remainderman may not be 
in a position to know that the asset is unproductive. 
The third possibility is that the trustee has some funds, but 
not in sufficient amounts to make good the loss caused by his 
breach. If there was only a loss of income while the corpus of the 
trust remained intact, then to the extent that the apportionment 
exceeds the amount recovered from the trustee, the loss is shifted-
to corpus. When there has been a loss to both income and corpus 
as a result of this trustee's negligence, the problem is more complex. 
Let us assume a $1,000,000 trust res which has been reduced to 
$500,000 by the loss on an improper investment. In addition to 
the loss of corpus, there was also a $100,000 loss of income (five 
percent on one million dollars for two years) during the period 
the asset was retained. Of the $600,000 loss, assume $300,000 was 
recovered from the trustee. If apportionment is granted, the 
$300,000 recovery will be added to the $500,000 remaining from 
the investment, and the two apportioned together. Assuming a 
five percent yield on trust investments, the apportionment would, 
under the Restatement59 formula, be made as follows: 
$500,000.00 Salvaged investment 
300,000.00 Recovery from trustee 
$800,000.00 Total 
$800,000.00 
New corpus= 1 + (.05 X 2 yrs.) = $727,272 
Income= 800,000.00-727,273 = $72,727.00 
to the various cestuis in accordance with their respective interests. See In re Rosenbaum's 
Estate, 115 N.Y.S. (2d) 450 (1948). See especially the comprehensive annotation .in 9 
A.L.R. (2d) 1132 (1950). 
59 TRUSTS RF-STATEMENT SECOND §241 (1959). 
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Assuming that apportionment is denied, however, the life tenant 
should still share in the $300,000 recovery from the trustee which 
was partially in return for lost income. If a successor trustee 
brings suit, or if the two beneficiaries join and sue, the recovery 
should seemingly be apportioned according to their respective 
losses. This would give to income 1/6 of the recovery ($100,000 
lost income as to $600,000 loss in toto) or $50,000 as compared to 
$72,727 when apportionment is permitted. Although some courts 
have awarded the entire recovery to corpus,60 this seems improper 
and may encourage a separate action by the life tenant61 to recover 
lost income where this is permitted. 
IV. SUBROGATION AND EsTOPPEL 
One difficulty in applying apportionment arises when a life 
tenant, barred by laches62 or estoppel63 from commencing suit 
against the trustee, requests an apportionment of the same proceeds 
of the unproductive property. If the life tenant is not barred from 
seeking apportionment64 should the remainderman be permitted 
to recoup the loss from the trustee, or only be subrogated to those 
rights which the life cestui possessed (which would be nil if action 
by the cestui has become barred by !aches or estoppel)? To permit 
such an action by the remainderman allows the life tenant to ac-
60 In re Grabowski's Settlement, L.R. 6 Eq. 12 (1868). 
61 Plunkett v. Lampert, 231 Minn. 484, 43 N.W. (2d) 489 (1950). See also Talbutt v. 
Security Trust Co., (E.D. Ky. 1938) 22 F. Supp. 241 and cases cited in 136 A.L.R. 693 
(1942). These cases indicate that the life tenant may commence a separate action for lost 
income caused by the trustee's negligence. Even if the life tenant and remainderman join 
in an action against the trustee, it would seem that the court may grant separate damages 
for the injury to each interest and thus have a race of diligence determining which award 
will be satisfied. 
62 Will of North, 235 Wis. 639, 294 N.W. 15 (1940). See 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., 
§219 (1956). 
63 See 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §177 (1956). But for the difficulty in successfully basing 
a defense on estoppel, see Liberty Title and Trust Co. v. Plews, 6 N.J. 28, 77 A. (2d) 219 
(1950). Cf. Estate of O'Donnell, 8 Ill. App. (2d) 348, 132 N.E. (2d) 74 (1956). See also 
language in In re Bothwell's Estate, 65 Cal. App. (2d) 598 at 609-610, 151 P. (2d) 298 (1944). 
64 See In re Bothwell's Estate, 65 Cal. App. (2d) 598, 151 P. (2d) 298 (1944); 
Delaware Trust Co. v. Bradford, 30 Del. Ch. 277, 59 A. (2d) 212 (1948). But see 
Spring v. Hollander, 261 Mass. 373, 158 N.E. 791 (1927); and the language in Green v. 
Crapo, 181 Mass. 55, 62 N.E. 956 (1902), indicating that the consent of a life tenant who 
individually held the unproductive property as a tenant in common with the trustee would 
bar her action against the trustee for negligence. A strong argument in favor of estopping 
the life tenant from obtaining apportionment is the unfairness of permitting him to 
remain silent while the property is retained and while the remainderman may be totally 
unaware that that property in question is unproductive, and then to claim a portion of 
the corpus. If the life tenant's failure to complain earlier was in any way responsible for 
the loss, it would seem only fair to prevent the life tenant from shifting this loss to the 
innocent remainderman. 
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complish by indirection much the same recovery which he was 
barred from obtaining directly,65 although the amount of the 
recovery via apportionment might be smaller. On the other hand, 
it seems unjust to deny this remedy to the remainderman who 
may have had no earlier opportunity to compel a sale. These 
difficulties can be avoided and a more just result reached by 
estopping the life tenant from claiming apportionment under 
circumstances which would preclude his recovery against the 
trustee. 
Conclusion 
Although it is occasionally necessary to deny apportionment on 
equitable grounds, the application of this remedy usually produces 
a fair and desirable result. A rule which requires an apportion-
ment without a determination of the testator's unexpressed inten-
tion avoids much costly litigation. Also, a trustee who knows that 
apportionment will ultimately be granted is able to determine 
whether to retain unproductive property without unduly favoring 
either class of beneficiary. Finally, when the retention is ordered 
to preserve the trust res for the benefit of all the cestui, apportion-
ment distributes the burden of holding this property in a manner 
which seems equitable and in accord with the intention of the 
testator in most instances. It is therefore not surprising that, 
absent a contrary provision in the trust instrument, both the courts 
and state legislatures are tending toward the consistent applica-
tion of the apportionment remedy. 
Bruce M. Stiglitz, S. Ed. 
65 Nevertheless, the reasoning of cases allowing suit by the remainderman in the 
absence of apportionment would appear equally applicable where there had been an 
apportionment. See cases cited in 7 AL.R. 1021 (1920), allowing recovery by the re• 
mainderman despite his acquiescence during the life of the life tenant, since the remainder-
man had then no right to enforce his claim to the fund. 
